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Abstract
Despite their flat, semantics-free structure, on-
tology identifiers are often given names or la-
bels corresponding to natural language words
or phrases which are very dense with informa-
tion as to their intended referents. We argue
that by taking advantage of this information
density, NLG systems applied to ontologies
can guide the choice and construction of sen-
tences to express useful ontological informa-
tion, solely through the verbalisations of iden-
tifier names, and that by doing so, they can re-
place the extremely fussy and repetitive texts
produced by ontology verbalisers with shorter
and simpler texts which are clearer and eas-
ier for human readers to understand. We spec-
ify which axioms in an ontology are “defin-
ing axioms” for linguistically-complex identi-
fiers and analyse a large corpus of OWL on-
tologies to identify common patterns among
all defining axioms. By generating texts from
ontologies, and selectively including or omit-
ting these defining axioms, we show by sur-
veys that human readers are typically capable
of inferring information implicitly encoded in
identifier phrases, and that texts which do not
make such “obvious” information explicit are
preferred by readers and yet communicate the
same information as the longer texts in which
such information is spelled out explicitly.
1 Introduction
There has been increasing interest in recent years in
the generation of natural language texts from, or us-
∗Many thanks to Richard Power and Sandra Williams for
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ing, ontologies ((Cregan et al., 2007; Kaljurand and
Fuchs, 2007; Smart, 2008), for example). Such “ver-
balisations” – translations of the logic of, for exam-
ple, OWL (W3C Consortium, 2012), into human-
readable natural language – can be useful for a vari-
ety of purposes, such as communicating the results
of ontology inference, generating custom texts to
suit a particular application domain or assisting non-
ontology-experts in authoring, reviewing and vali-
dating ontologies. This paper takes as its starting
point an observation about ontology structure and
use. The purpose of an ontology (specifically, the
so-called “T-box”1) is to define the terms of a par-
ticular domain in order to allow automated infer-
ence of the semantics of that domain. Given that
machines are essentially tabulae rasae with regard
to nearly any kind of world knowledge, it is there-
fore necessary to spell out the meanings of most
terms in what (to a human) would be excruciating
detail. In most, if not all, ontology languages, and
certainly in OWL, identifiers – the “names” for in-
dividual entities, classes and relations2 – are atomic
units. That is to say, every identifier is treated by
the machine as simply a flat string, with no internal
structure or semantics. The corresponding natural
language constructions – noun and verb phrases –
by contrast have a very rich internal structure which
can communicate very subtle semantic distinctions.
Best practice for human ontology developers recom-
mends that for every entity in an ontology, either its
identifier should be a meaningful simple or complex
term, or it should have a (localised) label which is
a meaningful simple or complex natural language
1“Terminology box”
2“Property” is the OWL terminology for a relation between
two entities
term. For example, in the domain of education, a
class intended to represent the real-world class of
junior schools ought to have (in English) an iden-
tifier such as junior school or a label such as
“junior school”. Ontology developers who follow
this best practice (and, according to (Power, 2010),
the vast majority do) produce ontologies in which
the entities are easily recognisable and understood
by human readers who can parse these identifiers, to
infer, for example, that “junior school” is a subclass
of the class “school”. As it stands, however, a ma-
chine will not make this inference. In order for the
machine to comprehend the semantics of this exam-
ple, there must additionally be an axiom equivalent
to “a junior school is a school”.
The motivation for this work is the desire to iden-
tify which kinds of identifier or label are “obvious”
in this way. That is to say, if we treat an OWL iden-
tifier as if it were in fact a multi-word natural lan-
guage expression, can we infer at least some of its
semantics from its properties as a noun phrase, for
example? This has two overall purposes: given an
existing ontology, definitional axioms for “obvious”
identifiers can be omitted when verbalising for a hu-
man user, in order to shorten the text and make it
more relevant, and, conversely, during the process of
ontology creation, if a human uses an obvious iden-
tifier, a reasonable guess can be made as to its defi-
nitional axiom(s), and these can be presented to the
user for confirmation, thus saving the user the need
to spend time and energy spelling out the obvious
for the machine’s purposes. This paper addresses
the first of these two purposes. Note that the aim of
this work is not particular to consider how best to re-
alise entity names in a verbalisation, but rather, how
to use the names of entities to guide the choice and
construction of sentences.
This work was undertaken in the context of
the SWAT (Semantic Web Authoring Tool) project,
which is investigating the application of NLG/NLP
to ontology authoring and editing (Williams et
al., 2011),(Williams and Power, 2010),(Power
and Third, 2010),(Stevens et al., 2011), (Power,
2010),(The SWAT Project, 2012).
2 Existing work
Other researchers have attempted to take advantage
of the internal structure of ontology identifiers to in-
fer semantics, but these have exclusively been con-
cerned with the question of checking or improving
an ontology’s coverage of its domain. Examples
include (Wroe et al., 2003; Fernandez-Breis et al.,
2010; Egan˜a Aranguren et al., 2008). To the best
of our knowledge, our current research is the first to
take advantage of identifier structure to infer seman-
tics in order to improve verbalisation and produce
more human-focused texts.
3 Hypothesis
Informal feedback from existing work indicates that
many readers are dissatisfied with the kinds of text
produced by ontology verbalisers, feeling them to be
somewhat fussy and unnatural. Some of this can no
doubt be put down to the verbalisations themselves
– it is very difficult to find a natural way to express
that one property is the inverse of another without
resorting to mathematical variables – but, as with
other generation tasks, the problem is not necessar-
ily just how things are said, but also in the selection
of which things to say at all. Our hypothesis takes
two parts:
1. linguistically-complex identifiers/labels are of-
ten defined by “obvious” axioms in the OWL
ontologies containing them, and
2. ontology verbalisations which omit such “obvi-
ous” axioms lead to a better reading experience
for users without sacrificing content.
A prerequisite for these is also the claim that
linguistically-complex identifiers are reasonably
common in ontologies. (Power, 2010) demonstrated
very clearly that recommended best-practice is in
fact followed very well in much ontology develop-
ment, and entities do tend to be given meaningful
names.
One caveat is necessary here. We are talking
about what an average human reader might reason-
ably expect to follow from a given use of language.
However, observing that a black horse is a horse,
a grey horse is a horse, a brown horse is a horse,
and so on, does not guarantee the truth of any infer-
ences we might make on encountering a reference
to a clothes-horse. There will always be situations
in which ordinary uses of language will need to be
made more precise. An interesting future direction
of this work would be to investigate whether it is
possible to detect exactly when such clarification is
necessary, in the context of ontology verbalisation,
at least.
4 Definitions
Of course, “complex”, “obvious”, and so on can be
loaded terms, and it is necessary to make them pre-
cise before continuing.
4.1 Simple and complex identifiers
Identifiers3 may consist of a single natural language
word, in which case we call it simple, or multiple
words, in which case it is complex. The words in a
complex identifier may be separated by spaces (“ju-
nior school”), punctuation (junior school) or
capitalisation (juniorSchool). In any case, it is
trivial to separate these words into a list automati-
cally.
4.2 Content words
In looking for “defining” axioms, we often need to
ignore words occurring in complex identifiers which
have some grammatical function. For example, if
comparing “has as father” to other identifiers in the
same ontology, we may ignore “has” and “as” and
consider only the content word “father”. “Has” oc-
curs far too frequently to be of any use in identifying
axioms relating to the semantics of “has as father”,
although it is of course relevant to what those se-
mantics actually are in any one of such axioms.
4.3 Constructed identifiers
A complex identifier is constructed if its component
words (or just its content words) are themselves sim-
ple identifiers in the containing ontology. For exam-
ple, if an ontology contains identifiers correspond-
ing to “French”, “woman” and ”French woman”,
then “French woman” is a constructed identifier. We
may wish to relax this definition slightly to consider
constructed identifiers where most of the component
3Henceforth, for brevity, “identifier” may mean “OWL iden-
tifier”, if that is human-meaningful, or it may mean “label”, oth-
erwise.
(content) words are also identifiers, or where com-
ponent words are morphological variants of other
identifiers.
4.4 Defining axioms
The meaning of a constructed identifier can be de-
fined in an ontology by axioms in which all, or most,
of its component or content words occur as, or in,
other identifiers. For example, if there is an iden-
tifier van driver, there is likely to be an axiom
similar to
A van driver drives a van.
So, for a complex identifier I , we take an axiom
A to be a defining axiom if:
• A contains at least two distinct identifiers,
• I occurs in A, and either
• for each identifier J 6= I in A, the content
words in J are a subset of the content words
in I , OR
• the content words in I are a subset of the union
of the content words of at least two other iden-
tifiers in A.
The third condition is relatively straightforward –
a phrase such as “white van man” can be defined in
OWL using at most terms corresponding to “white”,
“van” and “man”, but not every word in a complex
phrase must appear in its defining axiom. Adjec-
tives often work like this: we accept “a junior school
is a school” as being a defining axiom of “junior
school”, but “junior” only appears in the definien-
dum. It is worth noting here that a defining ax-
iom need not be the whole of the definition of its
definiendum; a complex identifier may have more
than one defining axiom associate with it, in which
case its definition would be the set of all of its defin-
ing axioms.
The fourth condition perhaps seems stranger. The
intention here is to capture defining axioms such as
A French woman is a woman whose nationality is
French
where “nationality” is not a content word of “French
woman”, and yet there is an underlying relation-
ship between this “extra” word/phrase and one of
the content words of “French woman”, namely in
this case that “French” is a nationality. One goal of
future work might be to look into ways to identify
such underlying relationships from OWL semantics
in order to use them in new contexts.
5 Corpus study
So far, we have given criteria for which identifiers
we consider to be linguistically-complex and for
which axioms we believe serve as definitions for
such identifiers. The immediately obvious question
is whether these criteria are useful. To test this, we
evaluate them against a corpus of 548 OWL ontolo-
gies collected from a variety of sources, include the
Tones repository (TONES, 2012), the Swoogle se-
mantic web search engine (Finin et al., 2004) and
the Ontology Design Patterns corpus (ODP, 2012).
The corpus includes ontologies on a wide range of
topics and featuring a variety of authoring styles.
By using the OWL API (OWL API, 2012), a
Java program was written to scan through the corpus
for identifiers matching the definition of “complex”
above, and for each such identifier found, look for
defining axioms for it. Of the logical entity types
possible in OWL – Named Individuals, Classes,
Data- and Object-Properties – it was decided to omit
Named Individuals from the current study. Much as
with proper nouns in natural language, the names of
individuals typically have less internal structure than
other kinds of entity or relation names, and those
which do have such structure (such as, e.g., “Lake
Windermere”) are usually very simple. Individuals
are also not really “defined” as such. One may state
what are deemed to be highly-salient features about
them, such as that Lake Windermere is a lake, but
this is not a definition. Had we included individuals
in this study, it was thought that the large number
of non-defined names would artificially depress the
statistics and give an inaccurate view of the phenom-
ena being studied. Re-running the analysis including
Named Individuals confirmed this hypothesis: less
than 10 ontologies in the whole corpus contained
any defining axioms for named individuals, with the
most common pattern having only 77 occurrences in
the whole corpus – a negligible frequency. It would
be interesting to look at these cases in more detail,
however, to examine what kinds of individual are de-
fined in this way.
Having identified defining axioms across the cor-
pus, the results were then abstracted, by replacing
the occurrences of content words of each identifier
in an axiom with alphabetic variables, so that
SubClassOf(junior school school)
and
SubClassOf(domestic mammal mammal)
both become
SubClassOf(AB B).
The occurrences of each abstracted axiom pattern
could then be counted and tabulated. Table 1 shows
the most frequent 10 patterns, comprising 43% of all
results. Across the whole corpus, 69% of all identi-
fiers were complex, according to our definition, and
of those, 45% had at least one defining axiom. These
figures indicate that the phenomenon we are investi-
gating is in fact a very common one, and hence that
any improvements to ontology verbalisation based
on taking advantage of identifier semantics are likely
to be significantly useful.
Of all the patterns identified, 64% involve the
SubClassOf axiom type (“A junior school is a
school”). A further 14% involve InverseObjectProp-
erties (“Bill is father of John if and only if John has
father Bill”), and another 14% involve ObjectProp-
ertyDomain or ObjectPropertyRange (“If something
has as segment X, then X is a segment”). Col-
lectively, then, these axiom types cover 92% of all
defining axioms. An informal glance at the results
involving SubClassOf axioms shows that what ap-
pears to be the case in Table 1 is generally true – the
bulk of the SubClassOf axioms involve some form
of adjective construction.
It should be noted here that the intention was to
use the absolute bare minimum of linguistic knowl-
edge in identifying these axioms – almost everything
is done by matching substrings – in order to avoid
influencing the results with our own intuitions about
how we think it ought to look. It is reassuring to see
nonetheless how far it is possible to get without in-
volving linguistic knowledge. Indeed, one of the on-
tologies in the test corpus has identifiers in Italian,
and it was confirmed by a bilingual English/Italian
speaker that the axiom patterns our software identi-
fied for that ontology were just as “obvious” in Ital-
Table 1: 10 most frequent patterns of defining axiom
No. of Pattern Example
occurrences
1430 SubClassOf(AB B ) SubClassOf(representation-activity activity)
1179 SubClassOf(ABC BC ) SubClassOf(Quantified set builder Set builder)
455 InverseObjectProperties(hasA isAof ) InverseObjectProperties(HasInput IsInputOf)
387 SubClassOf(ABCD BCD ) SubClassOf(Continental-Statistical-Water-Area Statistical-Water-Area)
348 SubClassOf(ABCD CD ) SubClassOf(NonWikipediaWebPage WebPage)
240 SubClassOf(ABC AC ) SubClassOf(Process-Resource-Relation Process-Relation)
229 ObjectPropertyRange(hasA A ) ObjectPropertyRange(hasAnnotation Annotation)
192 ObjectPropertyRange(hasAB AB ) ObjectPropertyRange(hasTrustValue TrustValue)
188 InverseObjectProperties(AB ABof ) InverseObjectProperties(situation-place situation-place-of)
179 InverseObjectProperties(Aof hasA ) InverseObjectProperties(contentOf hasContent)
ian as they are in English. There are limitations,
of course. A defining axiom such as “a pet owner
is a person who owns a pet” would not be picked
up by this software, as “owner” and “owns” do not
match each other as strings. To bypass this particular
limitation, the software has been modified to allow
the optional use of a (language-specific) stemming
algorithm before substring matching, so that both
“owner” and “owns” would be matched as “own”,
for example. The current work, however, focuses
on the non-stemmed results for reasons of simplic-
ity and time; we intend to carry out further research
using the stemmed results in future.
6 Generation study
6.1 Design
A core part of our claim for these defining axioms
is that their semantics are in some sense “obvious”.
A human reading a phrase such as “junior school”
is unlikely to need to be told explicitly that a junior
school is a school. This claim needs to be tested.
Furthermore, it was suggested above that ontology
verbalisations would be improved in quality for hu-
man readers if such “obvious” sentences were omit-
ted and the semantics implied by the internal struc-
ture of noun and verb phrases were used to improve
verbalisation. Again, it is necessary to test whether
any improvement does occur.
In order to test the first of these claims, a sur-
vey was designed, in which each question would
consist of a (verbalised) identifier phrase, followed
by three sentences containing that identifier phrase.
Respondents were asked to indicate which of those
sentences, if any, they were able to deduce from
the phrase itself, without relying on any domain
knowledge. The questions were based on the top
8 patterns of defining axiom from Table 1, and the
containing ontology of each was verbalised using
the SWAT ontology verbalisation tool ((The SWAT
Project, 2012)). The choice of 8 was motivated by
an intended survey size of 10 to 14 questions allow-
ing for some duplication of patterns in order to vary,
e.g., the order of elements in sentences, and to min-
imise the effects of possible domain knowledge on
behalf of respondents.
Figure 1 shows an example of a question from
the first survey. The prediction was that respondents
would be more likely to select sentences based on a
defining axiom pattern than sentences which are not
based on any such pattern.
The second claim required a more involved test.
It was decided to present respondents with two para-
graphs of text, both verbalised from the same set
of axioms “about” the same class or property. One
paragraph of each pair contains verbalisations of ev-
ery initial axiom, possibly with common subjects
or objects aggregated between sentences (the “full”
paragraph). The other omitted the verbalisations
of any defining axioms, and allowed aggregation
of common elements from within identifiers where
that was justified by one of the omitted defining ax-
iom. For example, the already-aggregated (in the
full paragraph) sentence
The following are kinds of atrium cavity: left
atrium cavity, right atrium cavity
was further aggregated to
The following are kinds of atrium cavity: left, right.
because of the defining axioms
A left (right) atrium cavity is an atrium cavity.
This second paragraph is the “simplified” para-
graph. Both paragraphs were checked in each case
to ensure that the original set of axioms could be
Figure 1: Sample question from survey 1
inferred without any external information, provid-
ing an objective guarantee that both carried the same
semantic content even if one only did so implicitly.
Respondents were asked to judge whether each pair
of paragraphs expressed the same information, to ex-
press a preference (or lack of preference) for one
paragraph over the other, and to select those sen-
tences from each paragraph which conveyed infor-
mation which was not conveyed by the other para-
graph. Figure 2 shows an example survey question.
Three hypotheses were tested simultaneously by
this survey. The first was that respondents would
be able to detect when two paragraphs contained
the same information at a probability significantly
greater than chance and the second that respondents
would tend to prefer the simplified paragraphs. The
third hypothesis was that respondents would be un-
likely to label information as being “missing” from a
paragraph when that information was implicitly ex-
pressed.
Our initial survey design also included pairs of
paragraphs which genuinely did contain different in-
formation, to serve as a control, and so respondents’
ability to judge pairs of paragraphs as carrying the
same information would be compared to their abil-
ity to judge when the presence of different informa-
tion. However, in piloting that design, nearly every
respondent reported such examples as being highly
confusing and distracting. This is perhaps not sur-
prising; the task of telling when two texts express
the same content is not symmetrical with the task
of telling when they express different content. The
latter is considerably easier, by virtue of the fact
that different content will involve different words or
phrases, or noticably different sentence structures.
Because of this, the decision was taken only to test
texts which objectively did contain the same logi-
cal content, and to compare the results to chance.
Each paragraph pair was controlled to minimise the
effects of ordering of information and, where possi-
ble, of length.
To maximise take-up and completion, it was de-
cided to try to keep the length of time taken to com-
plete each survey down to around five minutes. Con-
sequently, survey 1 had 14 of the relatively sim-
ple identifier inference questions and survey 2 had
4 of the more complex paragraph-comparison ques-
tions. Both surveys were published via Survey-
Monkey (Monkey, 2012) and were publicised via
the social networking sites Twitter (Twitter, 2012),
Facebook (Facebook, 2012) and Google+ (Google+,
2012).
6.2 Results and evaluation
The first survey attracted 30 respondents, the second
29. The data collected from the first survey are sum-
marised in Table 2, where S is “sentence predicted
to be obvious by a defining axiom pattern” and J is
“sentence judged inferrable from the given identi-
fier”. Applying a 2 × 2 χ2 contingency test results
in χ2 = 342.917, df = 1 and P < 0.0001, indi-
cating an extremely significant association between
the predicted obviousness of a sentence and respon-
dent judgement of that sentence as following from
the given identifier.
It is interesting, however, to note the top row of
Table 2: for sentences which are predicted to hold,
human judges are ambivalent as to whether to judge
it as definitely true or not. One interpretation of this
result is that, while it is very clear that non-defining
axioms can not be inferred from identifier phrases,
people are hesitant to commit to asserting these ax-
ioms in an unfamiliar domain, perhaps for fear of an
unknown exception to the general rule. For example,
Figure 2: Sample question from survey 2
while “a Qualifier Noun is a Noun” is usually a good
rule of thumb, “a clothes-horse is a horse” is a clear
counterexample. So perhaps the better interpreta-
tion of these results would be to say that, presented
for example with a phrase of the form “Qualifier
Noun”, a reader would not be surprised if it turned
out that the entity referred to is also a “Noun”. Ei-
ther way, these statistics suggest that it could well be
safe, when generating texts, to omit defining axioms
and allow readers’ default assumptions to apply. A
simple improvement suggests itself. In the situation
where a particular defining axiom pattern would be
predicted, but its negation is in fact present, the said
negation is automatically highly-salient. It is always
likely to be worthwhile verbalising “a clothes-horse
is not a horse.”
Table 2: Results of the survey on identifier inference.
J not J
S 224 211
not S 44 739
It is also interesting to separate out the results of
this survey by type of axiom. There were three gen-
eral families of defining axiom type tested – Sub-
ClassOf (“A junior school is a school”), InverseOb-
jectProperties (“Bill is father of John if and only if
John has father Bill”) and ObjectPropertyRange (“If
something has as segment X, then X is a segment”).
Table 3 shows the results broken down by these cat-
egories, where “SC” is SubClassOf, “IOP” is In-
verseObjectProperties” and “OPR” is ObjectProper-
tyRange.
Table 3: Breakdown of identifier inference results by ax-
iom type.
J not J
SC 152 109
IOP 52 64
OPR 20 38
A 3 × 2 χ2 test results in χ2 = 13.54, df = 2
and P = 0.001148, indicating that the judgement
of a sentence as obvious or not varies to a signif-
icant degree with the type of sentence it is. This
is perhaps to be expected, given that not all axiom-
types can be verbalised by sentences of similar lin-
guistic complexities. In particular, it is very difficult
to see how to verbalise ObjectPropertyRange sen-
tences without appealing to the use of variables such
as X and Y, which tend to lead to rather clunky sen-
tences. Sentences corresponding to SubClassOf ax-
ioms are most likely to be judged as obvious. Fur-
ther work is necessary to determine the reasons for
these differences empirically.
Table 4: Results of paragraph comparison survey (I)
Yes No
Same info 74 22
Prefer simplified 61 24
paragraph
Table 4 summarises the results of the “same
information” and “preference” questions from the
paragraph-comparison survey, aggregated across
questions. Comparing each of these to a random
distribution of Yes/No answers gives, in turn, χ2 =
15.198, df = 1 and P < 0.0001 (same information)
and χ2 = 8.498, df = 1 and P = 0.0036 (prefer-
ence), indicating an extremely significant likelihood
of judging two paragraphs containing the same in-
formation as in fact doing so, and a significant like-
lihood of preferring the more concise of such para-
graphs.
More interesting are the results shown in Table
5. Here, taken across all paragraph-pairs, E denotes
that the information expressed by a sentence in one
paragraph is explicitly expressed in the other para-
graph, and J denotes the judgement as to whether
each sentence was judged to express information not
also expressed in the other paragraph. These dis-
tributions of observations need to be compared, for
explicit and implicit in turn, to the expected distri-
butions of judgements as to whether the information
is missing or not. For explicit information, the ex-
pected distribution is zero judgements of “missing”
– where sentences were explicit in both paragraphs,
they were in fact identical in both paragraphs and
so should never have been judged missing – and 696
judgements of “not missing”. It scarcely needs a sta-
tistical test to show that the actual observations of
3, and 693, respectively, do not differ significantly
from these expectations. Nonetheless, Fisher’s exact
test (since one of the expected values is 0, ruling out
χ2) gives P=0.2495. For implicit information, the
null hypothesis is that implicit information is indis-
tinguishable from absent information, and so the ex-
pected distribution is 290 judgements of “missing”
and zero judgements of “not missing”, compared to
observations of 33, and 257, respectively. Apply-
ing Fisher’s exact test gives P less than 0.0001, indi-
cating an extremely significant difference. In other
words, implicit information is readily distinguish-
able from absent information, as predicted.
Table 5: Results of paragraph comparison survey (II)
J not J
E 3 693
not E 33 257
7 Conclusion and further work
Beginning from some observations about identifier
use and semantics in ontologies, we posed two hy-
potheses, that linguistically-complex identifiers are
often defined by “obvious” axiom patterns in terms
of the content words contained in those identifiers,
and that these “obvious” axiom patterns could be
omitted from ontology verbalisations in order to pro-
duce clearer texts without significant information
loss. By means of an ontology corpus study, and the
survey evaluation of generated NL texts with human
readers, we have confirmed these hypotheses. As a
result, these generation strategies have already been
incorporated into the SWAT ontology verbaliser and
ontology authoring tool and are already being eval-
uated in use by ontology developers as those tools
progress.
Of course, there are many avenues along which
this work could be taken further. We have barely
scratched the surface when it comes to using under-
lying logical formalisms, and the information “hid-
den” in identifiers to improve generated text. Further
investigation of the possibilities of language-specific
stemming algorithms in defining-axiom-pattern de-
tection, the interactions between multiple defining
axioms for the same entities to form whole defini-
tions, and exploitation of the logical contents of an
ontology to determine the salience of “usual” or “un-
usual” features in order to aid text organisation, all
offer rich opportunities to improve natural-language
generation from ontologies. We look forward to be-
ing able to look further into these areas, and to iden-
tifying which of these phenomena can perhaps be
generalised to other NLG applications by means of
ontologies.
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